Patriotism is Useless

Some time ago, Sascha over at Heroic Dreams discussed “patriotism” as a virtue. He made some bold assertions like, “being a patriot requires courage, independence, justice, honesty and many more of man’s virtues. Thus, only a fully virtuous person can be a genuine patriot, and only a genuine patriot can be a fully virtuous person.”

Sascha defines patriotism as such:

patriotism [is] that specific virtue which concerns the proper relationship of the individual to that aspect of reality which is society. More specifically, patriotism is a constitutive part of the virtue of integrity; it is loyalty to rational moral-political-economic principles and the moral ambition to modify the social order of the society one lives in according to these principles. [italics in original; bold mine.]

Further, he states: He, who advocates and strives to put into practice rational principles that work to keep integrated the society he lives in, is a patriot. [bold mine.]

At the time when I read Sascha’s article, I was critical of it for various reasons–all of which, I still believe, are right and legitimate. Of course, for a better context of this discussion, it might help the reader to actually read his orginal post and my criticisms of it in its comments section.

My main criticism of Sascha’s article, I stated in the following terms:

The moral rules, Objective rules, that apply to individuals can consistently be extended to society of individuals at large. Thus, all one needs to know is a basic understanding of what works morally and rationally for an *individual*; a society of such individuals will invariably take care of itself.

Further, it should be clear that any definition of patriotism must include (implicitly atleast) the object at the receiving end of the patriotic allegience, i.e., a country, a region, or a society.

Like Sascha defines it, patriotism is essentially loyalty to the society one lives in. And according to him, this loyalty obligates the individual to strive to establish and maintain a rational order suitable to his standard of life in the society he lives in. Even though Sascha’s definition is narrow in that it does not include non-resident patriots, for example, it suffices in pointing out what patriotism basically is.

But notice that any definition of patriotism invariably burdens the individual with an obligation toward a society he is in someway connected to–either he lives in that society, or lives elsewhere but is a citizen of that society, or is ethnically/biologically linked to that society.

This burden or obligation to be preoccupied with the betterment of one’s society–whether one lives there or not–robs the individual of his freedom to choose his values, i.e., his freedom to choose which society or country he wishes to value and express his loyalty toward, regardless of where he lives or what his ethnicity is or which country he is a citizen of.

Patriotism–as its definition implies–does not afford the individual the freedom to choose any country or society to express his patriotism toward; that would render the concept of patriotism meaningless and useless (which is precisely what it should be to an Objectivist). Patriotism demands that the individual remain loyal to a specific society, culture, country; one that he is in some way connected to–either by accidentally being born there, or living there, or having ancestral lineage from that society.

Therefore, for instance, I cannot claim to be an American patriot because first, I am not an American; I was not born there; I am not an American citizen; I have no familial or ethnic roots there; I have no direct and regular contact with the societal institutions in America, nor do I live there.
Thus, the concept of patriotism is useless to me even if I choose to value America because the concept affords me no legitimacy to make the claim. If, however, I insisted that I am an American patriot because I choose to value America, then the concept of patriotism is rendered meaningless: anyone can be a patriot of any society, region, or country even if they have absolutely no connection to it save an emotional or philosophical connection. By this logic, a Cuban man could claim to be a patriot of China and an Iranian could claim to be a patriot of North Korea.

In order that the concept of patriotism have a specific identity, it’s scope needs to be delineated and differentiated from other expressions of loyalty and allegiance. Patriotism is an allegiance to a specific society or country that is in some manner closely connected or relevant to the individual.

Further, if you elevate patriotism to a virtue and insist that it be integrated with all other virtues, then you would essentially be burdening a man to value a society that he may consider irrational and detrimental to his values, toward which he may have no interest, and that which he may actually despise, thereby instilling a sense of guilt and moral failure for being unable to practice the “virtue” of patriotism toward his society. This, from an Objectivist perspective, is an unearned guilt, and therefore, the source of it, i.e., patriotism, is a vice.

Rand loathed and despised Russia. I loathe and despise India. I recognize no obligation to work toward the betterment of this irrational society or stay loyal to it in any manner. I choose to abandon this country at the first opportunity I get. Rand chose to do the same to Russia. She valued and admired America even before she set foot on American soil and became an American citizen. She could not, at that time, have been properly regarded as an American patriot; though, she certainly was the most American woman that has ever lived in America.

Additional Comments:

I wish to clarify one point. A rational man living in a rational society has every reason to value his society and the institutions thereof. In that case, yes, his valuation and loyalty to the rational society can be termed “patriotism.” However, that does not make a virtue out of patriotism. The virtue is of pursuing the rational values, i.e., the rational society. Thus, as I pointed out Rand’s argument–whatever moral code is applicable to the life of a man qua man, can also be extended to apply to a society made up of such men.

The problem with the concept of patriotism is that it places a boundary (almost in a literal, geographic sense) on the object of one’s loyalty or allegiance. This problem can easily slip into becoming an immoral vice when patriotism actualizes as jingoism. Therefore, if one were to get rid of bounded limitation, i.e., get rid of the notion that patriotism is a virtue, then all that is required of a virtuous man is pursue his rational values–whatever and wherever they may be.