Reason as the Leading Motive

Cambridge Philosophers

Posted by Jerry on June 25, 2007

Last night, I was thinking about G. E. Moore’s “famous” proof for the existence of the external world. Once you know what this famous proof entails, you will (perhaps) be shocked by the absurdity of the argument offered by this Cambridge philosopher and find it incredulous that what Moore offered is regarded respectfully as a “proof” and that other philosophers actually preoccupied themselves with grappling with its implications.

Here is what Moore had to say:

By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’, and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’ (‘Proof of an External World’ 166).

Moore then goes to argue that this demonstration of his hands was a ‘perfectly rigorous’ proof of the existence of external objects. For its premises certainly entail its conclusion and they are things which he then knew to be true —

I knew that there was one hand in the place indicated by combining a certain gesture with my first utterance of ‘here’ and that there was another in the different place indicated by combining a certain gesture with my second utterance of ‘here’. How absurd it would be to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case! You might as well suggest that I do not know that I am now standing up and talking — that perhaps after all I’m not, and that it’s not quite certain that I am! (‘Proof of an External World’ 166)

Contrast this with Rand’s proof for the existence of the external world. According to Rand, the primacy of existence is axiomatic and undeniable because any denial of existence presupposes two things–that there is a consciousness attempting to make a denial, and that the consciousness is attempting to deny something that it is conscious about.

Rand* points out that consciousness is always consciousness about something. To be conscious is to have contents of consciousness. Thus, Rand offers Existence, Consciousness, and Identity as the axioms of her philosophy.

Wittgenstein, on the other hand, decided to simply dismiss the whole endeavor of proving the external world as futile because, according to him, making such metaphysical propositions is meaningless–nothing of meaning can be said about such topics. Further, he actually supported Moore’s proof for the external world by claiming that its epistemological truth-status cannot be known and therefore cannot be refuted. In other words, Wittgenstein argued that denying Moore’s proof would be nonsense–devoid of sensible or empirically testable claims–and hence his proof stands unchallenged. (Any Wittgenstinian scholars, correct me on this interpretation if I am wrong.)

There is something else Wittgenstein argued: he compartmentalized human discourse into separate language frameworks that cannot inform each other or engage in cross-framework dialogues. He called these separate frameworks of language contexts “language games.” Thus, he said, the words and concepts we use while speaking about religion (for example) has its own rules and logic and cannot be analyzed using words, concepts, and rules we use while speaking about science. Thus, no religious claims could be analytically critiqued by using logical, scientific, or empirical arguments because that would be trying to impose the “rules” of one language game (science) upon another language game (religion).

Thus, according to Wittgenstein, if we are to talk about religion, we must use the “rules of grammar” that pertain to the language game of religion. In other words, while talking about religion, we must use and analyze words like “faith,” “revelation,” “god,” etc. as defined by the religious context itself.

Some easy criticisms of this theory that I can think of at the top of my head are these: What defines a language framework or a language game? How finely or crudely does it differ? Is there a language game–rules of logic and grammar–for each religion, each branch of science, each geographical culture? Further, if this is so, can any attempt at meaningful criticism be ever made across language games? If not, then even Wittgenstein’s own theory is functioning within its own linguistic framework of, say, Wittgenstinian philosophy, and that he cannot impose his rules of language on the rest of philosophy!

Next, humans do not learn language and concepts in such a fractured fashion during their intellectual development. We do not take separate lessons on the words used in “science” and then words/concepts used in “art” and then those used in “religion.” Our learning of language begins from a common category of words based on a common abstraction of concepts from our perceptual experiences corresponding to our intellectual growth. As we develop conceptually, we begin using and applying concepts across a variety of areas by creating sophisticated and complex vocabularies, while still retaining the orginal meaning of concepts.

Thus, while I might first learn that the word “desert” refers to a geographical region characterized by dunes of sand, later in my conceptual development, I learn that I can use the word “desert” to also refer to a region characterized with large fields of ice, or refer to an emotional state of loneliness, for example. Thus, I have used concepts across Wittgenstinian linguistic contexts while still preserving the meaning and integrity of the original concept. Indeed, this is how we communicate.

Another important point is that all knowledge that any one individual possesses–including specialized knowledge pertaining to science or religion–is structured upon and depends upon the basic common concepts of a language residing in that individual’s conceptual consciousness. Thus, as I realize that “faith” and “reason” are two concepts pertaining to the domain of “religion” and “science,” I also come to realize that “faith” and “reason” have something in common; i.e., they are both regarded as means of attaining knowledge in their respective domains.

Wittgenstein was vocally anti-science; he even actively discouraged his students from pursuing intellectual professions and impelled them to adopt manual labor as career choices. One of his lovers–and disciples–followed his advice and gave up a promising career as an intellecual to become a manual laborer. He was also harshly critical of professional philosophers–in Cambridge and elsewhere–while at the same time openly and disdainfully admitting that he hardly read any of their works or that of past philosophers.

In fact, Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein reached a point where they could hardly see eye-to-eye; Russell had high expectations of the young Wittgenstein, but soon after the publication of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, Russell gave up any hope of seeing a breakthrough work of intellectual rigor from him. For his part, Wittgenstein considered Russell a stronger mathematician than a competent philosopher–at best.

It seems so strange to me that Wittgenstein is considered by many to be one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century.

*By including Ayn Rand in this discussion, I do not intend to imply that she was one of the Cambridge philosophers, nor that she was an academic who engaged these philosophers in dialogue. I merely cite her to highlight the rigorous approach of her proof in contrast to that of Moore.


14 Responses to “Cambridge Philosophers”

  1. Graham said

    Hi. First post. I follow you on the fact that Rand uses the undeniable primacy of existence to prove that in fact, existence exists… but how does it follow from that that there is an external world? Thanks.

  2. Ergo said

    Hi Graham,

    I can only give you a brief account of the basic Objectivist principles in this comment. For indepth detail and logical clarity, I refer you to Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand and John Galt’s speech in Atlas Shrugged.

    First, in order to properly grasp the principles of Objectivism, one has to first set aside the traditional vocabulary in philosophy that has muddled so many issues. The primacy of existence does not *prove* that existence exists. “Existence exists” is an axiom, i.e., an irreducible, self-evident, premise. Axioms cannot be proven, only grasped, identified, and validated.

    Next, there is no such dichotomy as “external” existence and “internal” existence; this dichotomy has been created and propogated by traditional philosophy. What is traditionally referred to as “internal” existence is the content of the mind, i.e., the contents of consciousness. But Ayn Rand demonstrated that there can be no “contents” of the mind without there being what traditional philosophy calls “external existence.” Ayn Rand states that a consciousness aware of nothing but itself is a contradiction of terms.

    The fact that existence exists is validated by two things, which are also its corollaries:
    (1) the consciousness engaged in the act of contemplating the fact of existence implies that consciousness exists and is part of all that which exists.
    (2) the fact of a consciousness existing validates the existence of external entities which form the very content of the consciousness, i.e., which is the content of awareness.

    In Ayn Rand’s words: “Existence exists—and the act of grasping that statement implies two corollary axioms: that something exists which one perceives and that one exists possessing consciousness, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which exists. If nothing exists, there can be no consciousness: a consciousness with nothing to be conscious of is a contradiction in terms. A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms: before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something.”

    Thus, we have existence as an irrefutable fact and consciousness as an undeniable constituent of existence and which is at the same time aware of so-called “external” existence. Now, since existence exists and consciousness is conscious of existence, it necessarily implies the third axiom of Identity, i.e., that something exists. In other words, to know that something exists (existence exists) is the same as to know that something exists. Derivatively, existence is identity, i.e., to exist is to exist as something of a specific nature with specific attributes. Thus, even consciousness–as part of all that which exists–has an identity, and its metaphysical role is identification.

    Thus, we have three undeniable axioms: Existence, Consciousness, and Identity.

    For more elaboration, please refer to Ayn Rand’s works or to the book I mentioned above. For a somewhat related post, read Omniscent Knowledge: A Consequence of Mind-Body Duality.

  3. Graham said

    Thanks for the thorough reply. We’re on the same page, just, sometimes I just like to clarify things. I never got into Objectivism deeply enough to recite the principles contained in it so well (as you just have), but I do like to check to make sure I’m not misunderstanding.

    Anyways, keep up the good work. Your stuff leads me down interesting pathways. If I had one suggestion to make it would be to not always sift thoughts through the Ayn Rand filter. Given, she’s brilliant, but it seems I hear her name every other post. Surely the ideas of Milton Friedman (which align nicely with Rand in most respects) can not only lend some insight into why Indian or African or American economics are taking a turn for the worst, but also give some less abstract solutions. That’s just an example though. Thanks again.

  4. Trey said

    Rand’s argument settles nothing. That entire line goes back to late modern philosophers (Kant, Schopenhauer, etc.) who realized the error in Cartesian dualism.

    If the argument ends there it is fine. However, the “external” world part is vague. This is tied to a notion of “mind-independence”, however this does not follow. When we think of the “everyday” world, most people assume mind-independence, however this has not been demonstrated.

    Consider dreams, which are “mind-dependent”. Sensations exist in dreams. That is, we are given the sensations of color, shape, etc. No one is going to call these “mind-independent” (although they could be, just as the “mind-independent” naive daily world could be considered “mind-dependent”).

    So, if by external world all that is meant is something like phenomena, or objects of perception, fine.

    And that is already given.

    Nothing has been proved.

    Your discussion about ‘desert’ seems to be muddled. When you use ‘desert’ in its new sense (e.g. “emotional state of loneliness” or “ice field”) you are no longer using it within the same language-game (i.e. its context is different).

    If you speak to a friend on the phone (you don’t know where they are) and they say “It is a desert here” you are in a predicament.

    Before the “new” meaning of the word, you knew what they were talking about (assuming that you both had only the one use of the word).

    However, now you don’t know which context it is framed in.

    That is, the “rules of the game” are not apparent to you.

    So, you have changed the meaning of the word ‘desert’ (that is it now has more contexts).

    However, the original context can still be used, but it requires specification.

    The word’s use has changed. (“A word’s use is its meaning in language.”)

    Also, on the Moore comment, Wittgenstein would not have accepted Moore’s proof. Since it is “non-verifiable” it would be nonsense, not vacuously true.

  5. Ergo said


    As you said, consider dreams. Dreams–by definition–are not mind-independent (contrary to what you say. Who would be doing the “dreaming”? In whose brain is this dream emerging?).

    Further, you said, “sensations exist in dreams.” Now, either you are being sloppy in your choice of words or you really believe that, in which case you would be wrong. “Sensations” cannot exist in dreams; only the experience of the phenomena of sensation can exist in dreams. When you “touch” something in your dreams, your sense organs–namely, the skin on your fingers–haven’t “touched” anything in reality; in your dreams, your brain simulates the experience of sensation by activating the braincenters that normally integrate such sensual data and form percepts. Now, the exact details of how this works is not in the realm of philosophy, but in the domain of science–neurobiology.

    When Objectivism speaks of mind-independence, it literally means that–an existence that exists independent of the mind. Consciousness–axiomatically–would not exist without the primacy of existence. This is because consciousness needs to be conscious of *something*, since it is metaphysically passive; and the contents of consciousness emerge from mind-independent reality. Likewise, the content of dreams–such as the experience of sensational phenomena–have to have their basis in waking reality. Despite the apparent limitlessness of our dreams, you will never dream about that which your brain has absolutely no rudimentary content of some kind from waking reality.

    Your comments on the use of the word “desert” actually go to support my own point–that cross-contextual communication is indeed possible and is done all the time, contra Wittgenstein.

    You said Witty would not have accepted Moore’s proof. You are factually incorrect there. Wittgenstein not only accepted Moore’s “proof”, but went ahead and defended it against some of the other philosophers who were asking his opinion on it at that time.

  6. Trey said

    I said, first of all, that dreams were “mind-dependent”. However, we could construct a theory in which they are mind-independent (positing mind-independent objects, much as we do in the “real world”). However, discussion about dreams is biased in that it is equivalent to discussion about memories. Memories are also mind dependent. All reflection is about memories, so how can we say that anything is mind-independent?

    By talking about “sense organs” being “activated” by “objects” you are assuming a scientific theory. Which of course is untenable (since you would have to overcome the problem of induction (or admit Popper’s conception of science (i.e. all science shows us is what is not the case. This is nowhere near the certainty required to justify that premise (If my friend tells me he is thinking of a number, x, and he tells me it is not pi, and asks me to tell him what x is, his “hint” does not help. Or, if a new friend (who I have not seen in person) tells me to meet him in the park and that he will be wearing a non-red sweater vest, I am not much better off (this is not as strong an analogy, since we have “countably” many sweaters and colors to check in the park)).

    You may as well say that God is how you know that things exist independently of mind.

    Wittgenstein never said that cross-contextual communication is impossible.

    He simply said that you can not use one of the uses of a symbol in another location in the language.

    (e.g. cannot use “wind” (noun) in place of “wind” (verb). If you could, since you can also use “breeze” in place of “wind” (noun) you could say “I breeze the clock”.)

    The deserts you list have different uses. That is, they have different sentences that describe them.

    If I take description three “a barren emotional landscape” and call it ‘desert’ then I can substitute it in a sentence like “My life is a desert”: “My life is a barren emotional landscape.”

    If we take the second use: “A hot sandy region” and attempt to use it in the first
    we get “My life is a hot sandy region.” Now, I don’t know if the speaker means a body part or what. Since we have a knowledge of other uses of the word, we can infer, possibly he means “a barren emotional landscape”.

    You can compare uses, but not replace one for another (as you can with parts).

    That is, the words must have the same function to be interchanged.

    However, there is nothing stopping us from discussing their uses.

    But, it is obvious that we are still discussing their uses within language

    But it is obvious that the words use is different here (in the discussion (i.e. they are not referencing “objects” in the “real world”). When I list the definitions of “desert” I am not referencing anything, so the use is different.

    When I say “desert” means “a hot sandy region” I am not using desert as I am when I say, the Sahara is a desert.

    So the there is a “language-game” for comparing “words from various ‘language-games'”.
    That is, the words must have the same function to be interchanged.

    (language-game really means “rules for application” or something to that extent)

    I will try to read what Wittgenstein said about Moore’s proof. It seems contrary to what I understand from his works.

    But then again, I am not a Wittgenstein “apologist”; I simply think that some of his ideas are correct.

  7. Trey said

    Wittgenstein did not agree with Moore’s argument, but with the conclusion.

    It is in the following fashion:
    “For, once that distinction is properly appreciated, room can be made for another position, which, while critical of Moore, would feel no pressure towards providing an account of how the belief in the existence of the external world may indeed be warranted. To wit: surely if the background belief P – that there is an external world – is needed to have a perceptual warrant for one’s empirical belief Q – as the indiscernability argument establishes – no warrant for P can be gotten by running an argument that has P as its conclusion and Q as its premise. Hence, Moore’s argument would indeed be guilty of (a maybe subtler kind of) epistemic circularity. Yet, that background belief could simply be taken for granted and lie beyond justification, having been swallowed by being trained within a community whose practice of asking for, giving and assessing reasons takes place on the basis of such a shared background presupposition. Indeed, I take this position to be elicited by some passages of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and endorsed by Strawson in his Skepticism and Naturalism. Some Varieties. On this view, Moore, the sceptic and Wright will all be guilty of a common mistake. Namely: to think that warrant is needed for the belief in the existence of the external world and differing merely on whether and how it could be gotten.”

    So this is different than what you said.

  8. Ergo said

    I don’t have my copy of the relevant book right now to quote Wittgenstein’s exact words in response to a student/philosopher regarding Moore’s proof. I can fetch it for you later if you are interested. My reading of it was that Wittgenstein agreed with Moore’s proof for external existence. It seems rather odd to say that Witty agreed with Moore’s conclusion (that existence exists) but not with his argument. It is hardly an intellectual feat to agree that existence exists–most of us, with the exception of some obscure philosophers, agree to this fact.

    Scientific theories are not untenable insofar as they are derived from application of reason to reality; science is the study of concretes on the basis of valid general principles.

    Popperian falsification is a terribly lacking method of epistemology–for exactly the reasons you pointed out. For one, he rejects the validity of inductive reasoning, which is a fatal flaw of his falsification criterion, because this means that while we can reject hypotheses solely based on whether or not they can be falsified, we have not investigated at all the *reasons* why they can or cannot be falsified–we have not studied the concretes and vetted them against a body of general principles. Paradoxically, the Popperian method of doing science introduces a greater element of uncertainty and ignorance in contrast to Popper’s intention to make the scientific method rigorous.

    The rejection of the inductive method is a crucial lacking in Popperian epistemology. Indeed, Objectivism argues that science does not–should not–function on the method of fabricating your wildest hypotheses and merely proceeding to falsify that which can be, because that permits the existence of wild hypotheses that merely have survived falsification for the moment–not necessarily a hypotheses that indeed reflects the state of reality and is consonant with general principles. Falsification is not the only valid criterion of true knowledge according to Objectivist epistemology.

    In any case, I’m not too knowledgeable about the exact lines of argument Objectivism offers against Popperian epistemology, beyond what I have already said. This is anyway diverting from the topic of my post, so I’ll let it rest here.

    Your description of Wittgenstein’s theory of language games is, in my opinion, a disservice to the originality of his theory. What you say is nothing different from common language sense. Of course you can’t make gross grammatical and semantical errors or confusions and communicate effectively at the same time. We didn’t need Witty to come around and inform us of it.

    Wittgenstein, more fundamentally, regarded the impossibility of communicating across linguistic frameworks. It’s not merely the case of “don’t use a noun as a verb where a noun is required.” It’s a case of “you cannot reject faith or religious beliefs using logical and scientific arguments, because this is a confusion of linguistic frameworks and a missapplication of respective language rules of the game.”

    This is a rather obvious reading of Wittgenstien. I’m surprised you didn’t grasp it, unless you are watering down his theories so much as to make it indistinguishable from common sense.

  9. Trey said

    Wittgenstein agrees that there is an external world, but he doesn’t agree with Moore’s proof. To agree with a conclusion, one doesn’t have to agree with the argument (e.g. cases where the conclusion is true yet the argument is unsound (e.g. If dogs have wings, the sky is blue. Dogs have wings. ::: The sky is blue) or invalid (e.g. If I wrote this then I am on my computer. I am on my computer. ::: I wrote this.)

    Wittgenstein accepts it on very different grounds (i.e. his argument is radically different).

    Popper did make science more rigorous, he made it deductive, but we can only know, via Modus Tollens, that something is not the case.

    However, there is no more problem of induction.

    Science is uncritical either way (induction is not justifiable without question-begging).

    I agree, however, that “God” is not a scientific proposition. Thus a scientific experiment can never prove nor disprove “God” (since it can only test propositions within its structure).

    However, one can replace “God” (or descriptions of him, (creationism, etc.)) with scientific models (e.g. evolution)), however this is neither science nor religion any longer, but an application of each (we do not call physics mathematics).

    So I see the point in “you cannot reject faith or religious beliefs using science” since this would require a definition of the term within the system. However this doesn’t (obviously) prevent one from arguing the structures of science and religion, it is just that neither subsumes terms (which is what would be necessary for a scientific refutation of God). Once a scientific term leaves science proper, it is no longer the scientific term, but enters into the “colloquial” “language-game”, the same with “God” (e.g. the sentence “Electrons are very small objects” is not a scientific proposition).

    Just as I cannot prove or disprove the existence of “Oscar the Grouch” or “the constant of the speed of light” within mathematics.

  10. Trey said

    Here are some of Wittgenstein’s remarks on Moore’s Proof:

    94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.

    95. The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules.

    97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux…

    136. When Moore says he knows such and such, he is really enumerating a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions.

    138. We don’t, for example, arrive at any of them as a result of investigation…

    This is a far cry from a “support of Moore’s argument”.

  11. Ergo said

    Here are some remarks on Moore’s proof from my copy of the book “The Duty of Genius”:

    [Moore] was attempting to refute philosophical scepticism. And it is in connection with this view of scepticism that [Wittgenstein] found something philosophically interesting about Moore’s “common-sense propositions.” They do not give examples of “certain knowledge”, but, rather, examples of cases in which doubt it nonsensical. If we could seriously doubt that Moore was holding up two hands, there would be no reason not to doubt anything else, including the trustworthiness of our senses. And in that case the whole framework in which we raise doubts and answer them would collapse: “Certain propositions belong to my “frame of reference”. If I had to given them up, I shouldn’t be able to judge anything.” One such proposition might be the statement: “That’s a tree,” said while standing in front of a tree:
    If I walked over to the tree and could touch nothing I might lose confidence in everything my senses told me… Moore said “I know that there’s a tree”, partly because of the feeling that if it turned out not to be a tree, he would have to “give up.”

    So, given the above context, Wittgenstein appears to agree with Moore’s common-sense propositions defending the existence of the external world, in the sense that knowledge of the external world cannot be doubted. However, upon a careful reading in other sections of the book, I notice that Wittgenstein argues against Moore’s conclusion, i.e., against being able to prove the existence of the external world. So, now, I’m not really sure what his exact position was, since he seems to contradict himself at different times (not referring to his invalidation of everything in the Tractatus).

  12. Trey said

    A lot of what Wittgenstein is doing is showing that there are no grounds for the belief of convictions (how could one justify the existence of the universe to someone who thought it was created when they were (any appeal to “carbon dating” etc. would confirm both theories)), but also that there are no grounds for doubt. The “conviction” is the established background against which all “facts” are placed. It, itself, is not a “fact”.

    The “external world” functions similarly.

    The “external world”, is again, different than the “mind-independent” world.

    What would it be that one is doubting if they doubt the “external world”?
    (The doubt references something.)

    The “external world” also exists in dreams. However, this is not considered “mind-independent” as the “flesh-and-blood” world.

    A good example is with color, when one sees ‘blue’, can they doubt it is ‘blue’? What would this doubt entail? How would one go about doubting this?

    Surely, they can doubt the ‘blue’ that they see is called “blue”. Maybe they should like to call it “violet” or “turquoise”.

    One could doubt that the thing they see is in fact a hand, but not that they in fact see something.

    (Even a “hallucination” is seeing something. One does not doubt that; they may doubt that they saw some “empirical” entity (i.e. observable by other humans)).

    Yes, he does argue against being able to prove it. That is, it is something beyond proving.

    As a+b=b+a is not provable, but rather a rule that determines the system.

    What in the Tractatus is invalidated?
    He did critique some parts of it (explicitly), but I have been considering this recently…

  13. Ergo said

    Sounds like the axiom of existence and the axiomatic nature of the senses, which can never be proved.

  14. Trey said

    Oui. I think that is pretty close to what Wittgenstein was showing.

    I am not explicitly knowledgeable of Rand’s ‘axiom of existence’ or ‘axiomatic nature of the senses’, but from what you said I think that is close to what Wittgenstein is discussing in On Certainty.

    105. All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life.

    Or here:

    116. Instead of “I know…”, couldn’t Moore have said: “It stands fast for me that…”? And further: “It stands fast for me and many others…”

    This goes further to show the “axiomatic” nature.

    However, the term “axiomatic” shouldn’t be confused with the common conception of an “axiom” as an “undeniable truth”. Rather, it is one of the statements that configures the system. As a+b=b+a is an axiom of a certain mathematical system. But we could define one with a non-commutative operator. It is not as if the “axiom” corresponds to something outside of the system; rather, it is what determines what is true within the system.(The “axioms” are non-justifiable: the statements within the system are justifiable against the axioms.)

    But yes, I do agree that there are some striking similarities between the two conceptions.

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