The Philosopher and the Plumber

“Ludwig Wittgenstein was by universal agreement one of the greatest and one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. There, however, the agreement stops. The question of how to read him is one that has excited a great deal of controversy ever since his first book [and the only one by him in his lifetime] was published in 1921. There is no consensus on how that book should be interpreted, or how his later work, Philosophical Investigations, ought to be read, or again on the extent to which the later work repudiates the earlier.”

So begins the introduction by Ray Monk on How to Read Wittgenstein. In essence, what Monk is admitting–perhaps unwittingly–is that there is universal agreement in the philosophical community that Wittgenstein was one of the greatest philosophers of the time; however, no one really knows why.

Indeed, one can draw an implied allusion from the above quote that this enigma–this elusive and unknown reason for why Wittgenstein’s work might be terribly important–is precisely the reason why he is considered the greatest philosopher of the time. Since we cannot understand or agree on what his position was, surely it must be something very important!

This attitude bears not too surprising parallels with the trends observed in post-modernist art, which, in general timeline, accompanies the height of Wittgenstinian scholarship, logical positivism, and linguistic analysis in philosophy.

In the post-modernist school of alleged art, the most bizarre, inexplicable, mystical, enigmatic, and even nonsensical creations carry the aura of high art and brands its creator as a ground-breaking artist. In other words, the more inaccessible a certain work is to human reason and human means of cognition, the more highly is the creator of the work praised (as an example, consider Ulyssses by James Joyce).

Throughout the book on Wittgenstein, Monk draws out numerous, explicit contradictions and paradoxes in Wittgenstein’s works–some littered within the same pages of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. And yet, instead of properly regarding these contradictions as the result of sloppy thinking, false premises, lack of clarity, and almost no knowledge of philosophy (after all, by his own admission, Wittgenstein was almost completely ignorant of the works of great philosophers of the past), Monk–along with other scholars on Wittgenstein–are insistent in delving into the paradoxes of his book as enigmas that were perhaps “consciously designed to elude comprehension.”

Wittgenstein admits that his work will not be easily understood, but even goes a step further and says that it cannot be understood because, in attempting to speak about philosophy, his work is nonsense. Nothing can be said or expressed in propositions about philosophy, aesthetics, religion, ethics, etc. Therefore, he says, “the book is an attempt to express what cannot be expressed, and, therefore, nonsense.”

According to Wittgenstein, the “strict” and “right method” of doing philosophy is to say nothing other than what can be said, “i.e., the propositions of natural science, something that has nothing to do with philosophy.” In other words, “all philosophical propositions are nonsense,” and “whereof one cannot speak thereof one must remain silent.”

Having said that, he then proceeds to write a book about philosophy and ethics, allegedly claiming to convey “unassailable truths” contained in the nonsense of his expressed propositions.

Wittgenstein says that if the reader does not already have an implicit understanding of the same views that he is attempting to convey in the book, then there can be no hope for new understanding:

“This book will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it — or similar thoughts.”

Further, in attempting to clarify the manner in which his book should be read and interpreted, he provides an analogy:

“[Anyone] who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them–as steps–to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)”

However, I would argue that his analogy is off-target in a very crucial respect. According to him, one would simply have to “throw away the ladder” once he has climbed up beyond them; in truth, however, even that presupposes a meaningful identification of the purpose of a ladder. To be consistent in the analogy, one must properly claim that even the concept of a ladder is nonsense, unspeakable, and unidentifiable! Then, “throwing away the ladder” is out of the question; indeed, it is nonsense!

By banishing the whole of philosophy (along with art, aesthetics, religion, and other fields) to the realm of nonsense and the unspeakable, Wittgenstein had effectively invalidated the function of philosophical propositions by alleging that nothing meaningful can ever be expressed by them.

Now, all of this reminds me of Ayn Rand’s brilliant observation of what philosophers like Wittgenstein and the others he spawned tried to accomplish. Through the character of Hugh Akston–the philosopher in Atlas Shrugged–Rand employs her characteristic style of reduction to clarity when she says:

People would not employ a plumber who’d attempt to prove his professional excellence by asserting that there’s no such thing as plumbing—but, apparently, the same standards of caution are not considered necessary in regard to philosophy.

Cambridge Philosophers

Last night, I was thinking about G. E. Moore’s “famous” proof for the existence of the external world. Once you know what this famous proof entails, you will (perhaps) be shocked by the absurdity of the argument offered by this Cambridge philosopher and find it incredulous that what Moore offered is regarded respectfully as a “proof” and that other philosophers actually preoccupied themselves with grappling with its implications.

Here is what Moore had to say:

By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’, and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’ (‘Proof of an External World’ 166).

Moore then goes to argue that this demonstration of his hands was a ‘perfectly rigorous’ proof of the existence of external objects. For its premises certainly entail its conclusion and they are things which he then knew to be true —

I knew that there was one hand in the place indicated by combining a certain gesture with my first utterance of ‘here’ and that there was another in the different place indicated by combining a certain gesture with my second utterance of ‘here’. How absurd it would be to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case! You might as well suggest that I do not know that I am now standing up and talking — that perhaps after all I’m not, and that it’s not quite certain that I am! (‘Proof of an External World’ 166)

Contrast this with Rand’s proof for the existence of the external world. According to Rand, the primacy of existence is axiomatic and undeniable because any denial of existence presupposes two things–that there is a consciousness attempting to make a denial, and that the consciousness is attempting to deny something that it is conscious about.

Rand* points out that consciousness is always consciousness about something. To be conscious is to have contents of consciousness. Thus, Rand offers Existence, Consciousness, and Identity as the axioms of her philosophy.

Wittgenstein, on the other hand, decided to simply dismiss the whole endeavor of proving the external world as futile because, according to him, making such metaphysical propositions is meaningless–nothing of meaning can be said about such topics. Further, he actually supported Moore’s proof for the external world by claiming that its epistemological truth-status cannot be known and therefore cannot be refuted. In other words, Wittgenstein argued that denying Moore’s proof would be nonsense–devoid of sensible or empirically testable claims–and hence his proof stands unchallenged. (Any Wittgenstinian scholars, correct me on this interpretation if I am wrong.)

There is something else Wittgenstein argued: he compartmentalized human discourse into separate language frameworks that cannot inform each other or engage in cross-framework dialogues. He called these separate frameworks of language contexts “language games.” Thus, he said, the words and concepts we use while speaking about religion (for example) has its own rules and logic and cannot be analyzed using words, concepts, and rules we use while speaking about science. Thus, no religious claims could be analytically critiqued by using logical, scientific, or empirical arguments because that would be trying to impose the “rules” of one language game (science) upon another language game (religion).

Thus, according to Wittgenstein, if we are to talk about religion, we must use the ”rules of grammar” that pertain to the language game of religion. In other words, while talking about religion, we must use and analyze words like “faith,” “revelation,” “god,” etc. as defined by the religious context itself.

Some easy criticisms of this theory that I can think of at the top of my head are these: What defines a language framework or a language game? How finely or crudely does it differ? Is there a language game–rules of logic and grammar–for each religion, each branch of science, each geographical culture? Further, if this is so, can any attempt at meaningful criticism be ever made across language games? If not, then even Wittgenstein’s own theory is functioning within its own linguistic framework of, say, Wittgenstinian philosophy, and that he cannot impose his rules of language on the rest of philosophy!

Next, humans do not learn language and concepts in such a fractured fashion during their intellectual development. We do not take separate lessons on the words used in “science” and then words/concepts used in “art” and then those used in “religion.” Our learning of language begins from a common category of words based on a common abstraction of concepts from our perceptual experiences corresponding to our intellectual growth. As we develop conceptually, we begin using and applying concepts across a variety of areas by creating sophisticated and complex vocabularies, while still retaining the orginal meaning of concepts.

Thus, while I might first learn that the word ”desert” refers to a geographical region characterized by dunes of sand, later in my conceptual development, I learn that I can use the word “desert” to also refer to a region characterized with large fields of ice, or refer to an emotional state of loneliness, for example. Thus, I have used concepts across Wittgenstinian linguistic contexts while still preserving the meaning and integrity of the original concept. Indeed, this is how we communicate.

Another important point is that all knowledge that any one individual possesses–including specialized knowledge pertaining to science or religion–is structured upon and depends upon the basic common concepts of a language residing in that individual’s conceptual consciousness. Thus, as I realize that “faith” and “reason” are two concepts pertaining to the domain of “religion” and “science,” I also come to realize that “faith” and “reason” have something in common; i.e., they are both regarded as means of attaining knowledge in their respective domains.

Wittgenstein was vocally anti-science; he even actively discouraged his students from pursuing intellectual professions and impelled them to adopt manual labor as career choices. One of his lovers–and disciples–followed his advice and gave up a promising career as an intellecual to become a manual laborer. He was also harshly critical of professional philosophers–in Cambridge and elsewhere–while at the same time openly and disdainfully admitting that he hardly read any of their works or that of past philosophers.

In fact, Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein reached a point where they could hardly see eye-to-eye; Russell had high expectations of the young Wittgenstein, but soon after the publication of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, Russell gave up any hope of seeing a breakthrough work of intellectual rigor from him. For his part, Wittgenstein considered Russell a stronger mathematician than a competent philosopher–at best.

It seems so strange to me that Wittgenstein is considered by many to be one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century.

*By including Ayn Rand in this discussion, I do not intend to imply that she was one of the Cambridge philosophers, nor that she was an academic who engaged these philosophers in dialogue. I merely cite her to highlight the rigorous approach of her proof in contrast to that of Moore.

Notes on Wittgenstein

I’ve just started reading Ray Monk’s biography of Wittgenstein titled Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius.

 

I’ve also read other works on Wittgenstein, such as the Philosophy Now edition dedicated to briefly exploring his life and works, The Essential Wittgenstein, Incompleteness, and Wittgenstein’s Poker. In all my readings of him, the man has come out to be far short of a genius; in fact, much worse, the man comes off being terribly confused, paranoid, self-loathing, and often, a charlatan disguised as a philosophizer.

 

The man’s deep-seated psychological confusion was apparent even from his younger years. According to Monk, Wittgenstein was ashamed of the fact that he had not killed himself–that he was not daring enough to commit suicide. Monk says that this feeling of shame and self-loathing lasted for nine years!

 

Well, Wittgenstein did achieve a different kind of suicide–a philosophical one. He set out to burn down entire philosophical edifices, reduce everything to mere linguistic dilemmas; and in so doing, he was–insofar as he regarded himself as a philosopher–engaging in self-immolation.

 

From his childhood, Wittgenstein suffered from an inadequacy of being. He never was quite comfortable with who he was–for example, he was eager to deny his Jewish heritage while his brother refused to do the same. He consciously made the effort to “[say] what was untrue because I was afraid of the bad opinion of those around me.”

 

Monk relates that Wittgenstein was a fairly poor student through most of his schooling. He was weakest in the “scientific and technical subjects,” which makes the extent of the man’s dishonesty even more persuasive because–in his later years as a philosophizer–he engaged in aggressive, vociferous, and adamant argumentation against Kurt Godel’s discoveries in technical and theoretical Mathematics only to be proved logically and irrevocably wrong.

 

All of this notwithstanding, I have found great amusement in reading about Wittgenstein and his cultish, adulating disciples from the Vienna Circle. This is the way I see it: sometimes, even a fool’s imagination can be very captivating. And admittedly, Wittgenstein had one very active imagination! Of course, I’m open to being proved wrong about the shallowness of Wittgenstein’s main ideas, and I am eager to read more from his sympathizers. As I move along in the book, I expect to resurrect this post with periodic updates on my thoughts.

 

“Given Wittgenstein’s theory of sense and nonsense, that very theory turns out to be meaningless! This is not an unforeseen consequence of Wittgenstein’s theory, something he realized at a later date. By the time we get to the end of the Tractatus it appears that Wittgenstein intended all along to show that what he had written is nonsense.”

– Mark Jago looks at Wittgenstein’s first theory of language, in the Tractatus. One of the conclusions of this theory is that the theory in the Tractatus is nonsense. [From Philosophy Now, Issue 58]

 

Added: As I read further into Wittgenstein’s biography, it becomes increasingly apparent that the man had a severely fractured soul. His life–at least as far as I have read–is so filled with internal and emotional turmoil, intellectual doubt, low self-esteem, and spiritual self-loathing. So intense is the depressive and melancholic mood that emanates from the biography that at one point I simply wanted to quit reading the book; it was ruining my own mood.

I will not quit the book, however. There is very little, almost nothing at all, about the Wittgenstein that I have read thus far that strikes me as evidence of an unusually intelligent or brilliant mind. Indeed, what is revealed is a man who is a chronic misanthrope, who exhibited extreme violence against some of his female pupils, was often dishonest—in short, a man of very weak character.

 

An Extremely Brief Survey of Modern and Contemporary Philosophies

I’ll just post these brief quotes taken from Dr. Nicholas Horvath’s compilation of important modern and contemporary philosophers. I’ll ruminate about them later. Feel free to add your ruminations to the mix.

Descartes – instrumental in developing subjectivism – though also known as the father of existentialism. He denied that objective reality was knowable. The rigid separation of the physical and the mental postulated by the Cartesian system still affects modern Psychology. Agnosticism and Skepticism were two schools of thought that developed out of Cartesian doctrines.

Berkeley, Locke, Hume – developed empiricism and placed primacy on the physical aspects of reality. This school of thought was detrimental to metaphysical scholarship that was originally formulated in Aristotelian principles of being and logic, also heavily used in the rationalism of Thomas Aquinas. “Empiricism over-emphasized sense knowledge and eventually led to the denial of the human intellect, or at least of an intellect distinct from sense knowledge. Locke, Berkeley, and Hume accepted this theory.”

Intrinsicism or “Rotten Dogmatism” of Leibniz appeared on the scene with proponents like Spinoza who rejected the subjectivism of Descartes and the Empiricism of Hume. Beings qua beings had dogmatic value.

Immanuel Kant – attempted to reconcile rationalism with empiricism, but ended up with idealism or “transcendental” philosophy that rejected axiomatic metaphysics. Kant’s phenomenalism created in a Copernican revolution of sorts in philosophy – he argued that the mind did not conform to reality, but that reality conformed to man’s mind. Thus, he said that the object depended upon the mind, not vice versa. The Kantian system logically led to the Deontological principle of duty and categorical imperatives. Man’s morality was bound by a sense of duty. Thus, the “morality of an act is not determined by the object… but by the pure intention of the acting subject.”

Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill – stressed that human knowledge is restricted to the facts of experience; it is impossible for human beings to know anything beyond this. Nature, causes, and ends of beings are unknowable; therefore metaphysics does not have an object. This gave rise to logical positivists and pragmatists schools of thought.

John Dewey – Pragmatist who also rejected the claims made by metaphysics that objective reality was knowable. Hence, Dewey pursued the practical and social aspects of philosophical speculation. Dewey advocated, in typical pragamatist tradition that ” concepts have no absolute value; their only value depends on their practical consequences, inasmuch as they are instruments for transforming as imperfect situation into a new and better one.”

Georg Hegel – logically arising from the Kantian system, Hegel developed Idealism that simply rejected all reality beyond the thinking subject. Hegel reduced reality to the Spirit. The Whole was the Absolute and contained all of reality. Existents in reality were “thoughts” in the Consciousness of the Spirit, or the Whole. Hegel’s Absolute Idealism and dialecticism gave rise to parallel schools of Idealist Rationalism, Kierkegaard’s Existentialism and Marxist dialectic materialism.

Marx – rejected the Idealism of Hegel and grounded the Whole into the collective consciousness of society. For Marx, individual freedom was attained by becoming merged into and one with the Whole of the Collective, such that there would be no more conflicts between separate entities, and all of history’s struggle will cease because of the seamless unity of the Whole.

Jean-Paul Sartre – based on the prevailing philosophical mind-set the rejected reality as knowable, Sartre claimed that reality cannot be met on intellectual grounds, “but only through the risk involved in some agonizing crisis in the life of the individual.” Sartre concept of freedom meant the incompleteness of man and the nothingness facing men. Freedom is not rooted in reason but in the forlorn despair of a god-less existence. Accepting Nietzsche’s “God is dead” doctrine, Sartre viewed man as having no essence for existing, but exists just as is. “If there is no God, there is no built-in essence, no objective system of values, especially no determinism. Man is free; man is freedom; man is condemned to be free.” The morality for men rests on individual choice. Hence, there is no “objective morality”. Man is responsible for all other men in intersubjectivity because he must choose morality in accordance to what he thinks others would also choose. Therefore, “the act of choice must be accomplished with a sense of anguish”. “Man is rotten; his death is as vain as was his entry into being.”

Wittgenstein and other logical positivists/neo-positivists – consider metaphysics as nothing more than a game of linguistic semantics. The “problems of philosophy” offer no solution to real life because they are basically meaningless. Hence, there is no philosophy.